Project DatabaseUtilities & Energy

W|EPC: DOMINION ENERGY (D) – OFFSHORE WIND PROJECT MONITOR Q320

July 2020

Table Of Contents

  • Dominion Energy (D) Q320 Capital Project Monitor: Key Takeaways (slide 2)
  • Virginia Clean Energy Act – Why Should You Care? (slide 3)
  • Energy Costs vs. Benefits (slide 4)
  • Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind (CVOW) Project Overview (slide 5)
  • Phase #1: A Closer Look At The Pilot Project (slide 7)
    • Regulatory Approval Timeline
    • EPC Contractor – Ørsted
    • Cost & Schedule Analysis
  • Phase #2: The $8B Main Course (slide 13)
    • Overview & Status
    • How big Are 12MW Offshore Turbines?
    • Offshore Wind: Construction, Risk, & Insurances Overview (slide 16)
    • Conclusions: Thank A Rate Payer (slide 20)

Key Highlights:
• Offshore Wind… An Awesome Opportunity for Dominion, Right?
• Phase #1 Demonstrator Costs Ballooned By ~73%…
• Phase #2 (2.6GW) Is The Real Prize – But Definitely Worth Keeping An Eye On Costs…

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